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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 10, 1954

SUBJECT: Consultation regarding Guatemala

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador João Carlos Muniz of Brazil
Assistant Secretary Henry F. Holland

COPIES TO: ARA - Mr. Woodward; Mr. Pearson; Amb. Pawley
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61120-1

Ambassador Muniz said that Chancellor Rao was very irritated by the fact that our Ambassadors in Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia had made overtures to the local government without awaiting initiation by Brazil.

I replied that our Ambassadors had done precisely what I had told him they would do, and that the lack of coordination was caused by the delay of one week in the departure from Rio of Brazil's special emissary who had fallen ill. I reminded the Ambassador of the following:

1. At the outset we had advised our Ambassadors in the three countries named and in Paraguay to delay their overture until either we or the local Brazilian Ambassador had advised him that Brazil had made the initial overture.

2. I had told him that when I began to talk to Ambassadors here in Washington it would be necessary for me to include those of the four countries assigned to Brazil; otherwise they would feel left out. I had warned him that when I talked to these men they would undoubtedly communicate with their governments, who, in turn, would request information from our Ambassadors in these countries. I had warned him that this would necessitate an early move on the part of Brazil; otherwise our Ambassadors would find themselves subject to interrogation, but without freedom to reply frankly.

3. Later on, I had told him that we were receiving expressions of concern from our Ambassadors in these countries at the fact that they were being requested for information, but that they saw no evidences of any move by Brazil. After conferring with him, I instructed our Ambassadors in these countries to go ahead and furnish the information requested of them.

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I emphasized with Muniz that if our Ambassadors had declined to furnish the information requested we would have produced in the minds of the Presidents of Chile and Bolivia, at least, the impression that we were planning an OAS meeting without letting them know about it. I pointed out that with their local Communist problems this would have been a very bad development. I pointed out further that it would have been very prejudicial for us to allow the Government of Uruguay to conclude that we were planning a meeting in Montevideo, but without letting them know about it.

Muniz agreed that the difficulty could not be avoided. He said that he would telephone Chancellor Rao tonight and would cable him as well in an effort to explain how the lack of coordination had arisen. He asked that we request Ambassador Kemper to see Rao and undertake to contribute to mollifying him.

He said that Rao had cabled him that Brazil preferred an earlier version of the resolution, one in which it was recited simply that measures would be taken to prevent the entry of further arms and to prevent the movement of agents, but without specifying that this would involve detention and inspection of ships and planes. I pointed out that such a vague text would immediately produce resistance from a number of States which would argue that it gave the United States too much liberty of action and would lend itself to abuses. He agreed with me, and said that he would try to persuade Rao that the text proposed by us was the better.

He asked whether we would go ahead and call a meeting even though Brazil and the United States might not be in accord on the text of the resolution. I said that from the very outset our plan had been that we would not call a meeting until we were in accord on the text. I said that events were developing rapidly, and that we might find ourselves forced to go ahead with a call for a meeting even without agreement on the complete text, but that we would be very reluctant to do so. I emphasized that it had been our desire from the outset to work in particularly close harmony with Brazil on this problem.



ARA:HFHolland:dwm